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A B S T R A C T
Purpose: Although most neuroscientists and physicians would argue against Cartesian dualism,
Descartes’s version of the psyche/soma divide, which has been controversial since he proposed it in
the seventeenth century, continues to haunt contemporary neurological diagnoses through terms such
as functional, organic, and psychogenic. Drawing on my own experiences as a person with medically
unexplained seizures, I ask what this language actually means if all human experience has an organic
basis.
Methods: Close reading of a textbook chapter on psychogenic seizures.
Results: I expose the author’s unreﬂective embrace of psyche and soma as distinct entities, his inherent
bias against illnesses labeled psychogenic, and the implicit sexism of his position. I further argue that
even when a patient’s symptoms are not alleviated, heightened self-consciousness and narrative framing
can strengthen his or her sense of agency and have therapeutic beneﬁts.
Conclusion: The ethical treatment of patients requires a respect for their stories.
 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of British Epilepsy Association.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.In a novel I am writing now, one of my characters says, ‘‘All
dying people are Cartesian dualists.’’ This overstatement hides a
piece of the truth. Illness can make almost every person vulnerable
to a mind/body split. If the ill person can still think clearly, he often
suffers an acute feeling that his body has betrayed him, that it has
gone its own way without him. The thinking, speaking ego, what I
like to call the internal narrator, appears to exist independently of
the afﬂicted body and becomes a ﬂoating commentator on the
goings-on, while the symptoms of disease wreak havoc on the poor
mortal body. Subjective experience often includes a self that
observes illness, even though the very idea of the self remains a
philosophical and scientiﬁc conundrum.
Rene´ Descartes’s dualism—his assertion that human beings
are made of two stuffs, spirit and matter—is unfashionable these
days and has, in fact, been highly controversial since his own
time. In her Philosophical Letters of 1664, the natural philoso-
pher, Margaret Cavendish wrote, ‘‘I would fain ask them. . .where
their Immaterial Ideas reside, in what part or place of the
Body?’’1 Neuroscientists, many of whom, I dare say, have read
little Descartes, repeatedly echo Cavendish’s complaint about
Cartesian dualism (one I share), and yet, it is important to state
that as of now there is no consensual theoretical model for the
brain-mind. The neural correlates of consciousness, NCC—which
might help explain the chattering internal narrator inside each
one of us—have not been found. The terms neural correlates,* Corresponding author.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.seizure.2013.01.002underpinnings, and representations do not close the psyche/soma
gap, they expose it. What we have are overwhelming amounts of
data, much of it from scans, but from other research as well, and
that data is racing far ahead of any overarching theory of brain
function.
But why is this important? And what does it have to do with
doctor-patient ethics and medically unexplained symptoms?
Medical knowledge is continually evolving and is always depen-
dent on new research. But as Thomas Kuhn pointed out in The
Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, the course of that research also
rests on paradigms, primary assumptions that lie beneath all
scientiﬁc investigation, and sometimes those paradigms shift.2
There is increasing recognition that the terms functional and
organic may be misconstrued from the start and rest upon an
artiﬁcial psyche-soma divide. As I pointed out by quoting
Cavendish, materialist monism is hardly new. In his introduction
to Outlines of Psychology (1895), Wilhelm Wundt carefully
articulates the debates between metaphysical and empirical
psychology and comes down clearly on the empirical side, arguing
that from his point of view ‘‘the question of the relation between
psychical and physical objects disappears entirely’’.3 Bio-physi-
cists, such as Hermann von Helmholtz in the nineteenth century,
were materialists, as was Jean Martin Charcot, the French
neurologist who never ceased hoping he would discover during
autopsy the brain lesions that caused hysteria.4 And Sigmund
Freud who coined the term conversion for hysterical phenomena
never stopped insisting that for him psychoanalysis was a
‘‘biological psychology.’’5 In Borderlands in Psychiatry, published
in 1943, Stanley Cobb, echoing Wundt, wrote:Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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problem . . .I would insist that the old dichotomies ‘functional or
organic,’ ‘mental or physical’ are not only wrong, but lead to bad
habits of thinking because they lead to static and obsolete ideas
and do not allow for modern pluralistic and dynamic ideas of
matter and structure. . .Anyone who stops to think realizes that
no function is possible without an organ that is functioning and
therefore no function takes place without structural change.’’6
This is indubitably true. Every phenomenal thought and feeling
is accompanied by brain changes.
In my 2004 edition of Campbell’s Psychiatric Dictionary, the word
psychogenic carries the following deﬁnition: ‘‘Relating to or
characterized by psychogenesis; due to psychic, mental or
emotional factors and not to detectable organic or somatic
factors.’’7 The deﬁnition may be saved from dualism by the word
detectable, but probably not. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ask
whether the distinction between psychological and physiological
should be erased from medical vocabularies or whether they
continue to serve some useful purpose.
I am one of countless people in the world beset by an
undiagnosed and medically unexplained symptom of a neurologi-
cal character. I wrote a book about it called The Shaking Woman or A
History of My Nerves that was published in 2009. The book is an
interdisciplinary investigation of my symptom, which draws on
insights from philosophy, the history of medicine, psychiatry,
psychoanalysis, neurology, and neuroscience research. Early in the
book, I describe the ﬁrst shaking episode that occurred two years
after my father’s death in May of 2006. I had been asked to give a
speech in memory of my father at a ceremony held on the campus
of the college where he had been a professor for over forty years.
Conﬁdent and armed with index cards, I looked out at the ﬁfty
or so friends and colleagues of my father’s. . .launched into my
ﬁrst sentence, and began to shudder violently from the neck
down. My arms ﬂapped. My knees knocked. I shook as if I were
having a seizure. Weirdly, my voice wasn’t affected. It didn’t
change at all. Astounded by what was happening to me and
terriﬁed that I would fall over, I managed to keep my balance
and continue, despite the fact that the cards in my hands were
ﬂying back and forth in front of me. When the speech ended, the
shaking stopped. I looked down at my legs. They had turned
deep red with a bluish cast.
My mother and sister were thrown back by the mysterious
bodily transformation that had taken place within me. They had
seen me speak in public many times, sometimes in front of
hundreds of people. Liv [my sister] said she had wanted to go
over and put her arms around me to hold me up. My mother
said she had felt as if she were looking at an electrocution. It
appeared that some unknown force had suddenly taken over
my body and decided I needed a good sustained jolting. Once
before, during the summer of 1982, I’d felt as if some superior
power picked me up and tossed me about as if I were a doll. In
an art gallery in Paris, I suddenly felt my left arm jerk upward
and slam me backward into the wall. The whole event lasted no
more than a few seconds. Not long after that, I felt euphoric,
ﬁlled with supernatural joy, and then came the violent migraine
that lasted for almost a year, the year of Fiorinal, Inderal,
cafergot, Elavil, Tofranil, and Mellaril, a sleeping-drug cocktail I
took in the doctor’s ofﬁce in hopes that I would wake up
headache-free. No such luck. Finally, that same neurologist sent
me to the hospital and put me on the antipsychotic drug
Thorazine. Those eight stuporous days in the neurology ward
with my old but surprisingly agile roommate, a stroke victim,
who every night was strapped to her bed with a restraintsweetly known as a Posey, and who every night deﬁed the
nurses by escaping her fetters and ﬂeeing down the corridor,
those strange drugged days, punctuated by visits from young
men in white coats who held up pencils for me to identify, asked
me the day and the year and the name of the president, pricked
me with little needles—Can you feel this?—and the rare wave
from the Headache Czar himself, Dr. C., a man who mostly
ignored me and seemed irritated that I didn’t cooperate and get
well, have stayed with me as the blackest of all black comedies.
Nobody really knew what was wrong with me. My doctor gave
it a name—vascular migraine syndrome—but why I had become
a vomiting, miserable, ﬂattened, frightened ENORMOUS head-
ache, a Humpty Dumpty after his fall, no one could say.8
Perhaps because I had had one seizure before, and had suffered
from violent migraines with vomiting since childhood, not to speak
of my unhappy stint in Mount Sinai, I did not rush to a neurologist.
My headaches had often been preceded by auras, with their
sparkling lights, black holes, supernaturally clear vision but also
fogs, lifting feelings that gave me a sensation of being pulled
upward, and just once, a Lilliputian hallucination, during which I
saw a little pink man and pink ox on the ﬂoor of my bedroom. A
single episode of shaking did not cause me undue alarm. It
appeared to be another curious adventure in a life marked by
neurological instability. I had febrile convulsions as an infant and
since my mid-thirties have had paraesthesia or what I refer to as
‘‘the body electric.’’ Because I had at the time of my ﬁrst convulsive
ﬁt and still have an abiding interest in neuroscience, I asked myself
what on earth had caused it. Because it appeared to have been
triggered by the speech about my father, I began to suspect a
diagnosis of conversion disorder or hysteria. The shaking ﬁts
happened again. They did not happen every time I spoke in public,
only once in a while, and then while climbing hard and fast on a
rocky mountain trail in the Pyrenees, out of sight of my
companions who were far behind me, I felt light-headed, strange
and, still panting from my exertion, I sat down on a rock to catch
my breath and felt my whole body go into violent shaking yet
again. I felt wobbly, drained and unwell for the rest of the day. I
began to doubt my own diagnosis. Maybe my shaking wasn’t
hysterical. After all, the good news about psychogenic seizures is
that they can’t kill you.
During my medical saga, I saw a psychiatrist, a psychoanalyst,
and a neurologist. My brain MRI showed nothing. The benzodiaz-
epine lorazepam did nothing to quiet my shakes, but the Beta-
blocker propranolol has been effective, although occasionally I
have felt a buzzing, humming sensation in my body, which I take as
a warning that without propranolol, I would probably be ﬂapping
like crazy. None of the doctors—they were all doctors—believed
that I was having conversion episodes and yet, none of them could
say exactly what I had either.
After I published my book, I received letters from physicians
and researchers all over the world. (The book was translated into
several languages.) There were two kinds of letters: those from
doctors who were interested in some of the points I had made and
either elaborated upon them or complemented me on my insights
and those in which I was offered a diagnosis. It is fascinating to note
that I did not receive two diagnoses that were the same. I especially
remember a letter from a medical researcher who was convinced
my shaking was being caused by a particular bacteria. Testing for
the bacteria turned out to be so elaborate and limited to a few
specialists that I never pursued it. So how to label my shakes:
functional, organic, psychic, somatic, psychosomatic?
The practical use of the word organic turns on visible location—a
brain lesion or abnormal electrical brain discharges that explain
the symptom—but its use also unearths ideas about what is real
and unreal. The bias is: if you can see it and name it, it’s real. If you
S. Hustvedt / Seizure 22 (2013) 169–173 171can’t, it’s not. New technology has altered visibility. Oxygenated
blood ﬂow can be seen on scans, but blood ﬂow is hardly a lesion. In
popular culture it has become common to talk about depression as
‘‘a chemical imbalance’’, as if balancing a person’s neurochemicals,
whatever that might mean, can resolve the complex reality of
depression. Schizophrenia has also become ‘‘an organic brain
disease’’, although its cause is unknown. The reduction of
psychiatric illness to brain processes comforts patients and their
families because the evocation of neural networks appears to
conﬁrm the physical reality of their illnesses. Cultural and medical
hierarchies about the psychic or physical nature of disease infect
our attitudes toward them. Unfortunately, chemical imbalance and
organic brain disease don’t mean much, despite the fact that the
brain is obviously at the bottom of these ailments.
Epilepsy is classiﬁed as an organic disease, psychogenic non-
epileptic seizures or PNES as a functional disorder because no
physical site of injury can be found. Nevertheless the two are often
confused. EEG’s may be ambiguous, and not all epileptic patients
have revelatory MRIs. The neurologist who suspects PNES must
become a medical detective, relying on a clue from her patient,
such as a seizure triggered by some powerful emotional event.
Then again, there are epileptic patients who can seize after a shock
or a strong emotional experience, too. The doctor may note the
failure of medication to stop the ﬁts. Of course, medication
sometimes also fails to cure genuine epileptic seizures. And
because some epileptic patients also have PNES, the picture can
grow pretty murky.
The Treatment of Epilepsy: Principles and Practice, 4th edition,
2006, has a chapter on PNES.9 The author of this chapter adopts a
conﬁdent authoritative tone, no doubt intended to buck up
budding neurologists who might be worried about misdiagnosis. In
a section labeled PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, he declares PNES a
psychiatric disorder and rehashes the DSM criteria for somatoform
disorders, factitious disorders, and malingering. Somatoform
disorders are ‘‘the unconscious production of physical symptoms
caused by psychological factors.’’9 He then emphasizes that the
patients are not faking, unlike the factitious folks and malingerers.
He makes no comment on the controversies that surround the
DSM’s metamorphosing categories or its lack of etiology. He
mentions that sexual trauma or abuse may play a role in
psychogenic seizures, and then, at the very end of this small
section, the reader is told, ‘‘From a practical point of view the role of
the neurologist and other medical specialists is to determine
whether organic disease exists. Once the symptoms are shown to
be psychogenic in nature, the exact psychiatric diagnosis and its
treatment are best handled by a psychiatrist.’’9 To be brief: send
the patient to the other ward.
Under the following section called MANAGEMENT, the reader is
told how important it is for the neurologist to communicate the
psychogenic diagnosis using words such as ‘‘psychological,’’ ‘‘stress
induced,’’ and ‘‘emotional. . . The physician communicating the
diagnosis must be compassionate (remembering that most
patients are not faking), but ﬁrm and conﬁdent (avoiding
‘‘wishy-washy’’ and confusing terms).’’9 The author is clearly
unfazed by any philosophical difﬁculties involved in opposing
organic to psychogenic. He does not bother to say that emotion and
stress are also organic processes, albeit not ones connected to
speciﬁc, locatable brain damage. His discussion is inherently
dualistic.
Rounding up his chapter, he names several ‘‘fashionable’’
syndromes that may be thought of as partly or ‘‘entirely
psychogenic’’.9 The words entirely psychogenic are followed by
parentheses, inside of which we ﬁnd the emphatic explanatory
phrase ‘‘without any organic basis’’.9 The implication is that they are
somehow non-organic, but how can that be? Are psychogenic
seizures unreal, ungrounded, and immaterial? Are they brought onby supernatural, spiritual forces? The syndromes he mentions
include ﬁbromyalgia, ﬁbrositis, chronic fatigue syndrome, and
irritable bowel. Note the use of the word fashionable. The word
fashionable is a put-down that effectively turns these syndromes
into ﬂimsy, effeminate, short-lived phenomena, similar to this
year’s skirt lengths or a new rage for open-toed shoes. Fibromyal-
gia, ﬁbrositis, irritable bowl, and chronic fatigue are all diagnosed
far more in women than in men, but this may in part be due to
prejudice. One study has shown that ﬁbromyalgia appears to be
under-diagnosed in men.10
The ethical implications of my semantic analysis of these
passages are not difﬁcult to extrapolate. It is not that distinguish-
ing between epileptic and non-epileptic seizures isn’t important or
that their etiologies aren’t different. Of course they are. It is that the
author’s supposedly neutral language is colored by a philosophi-
cally naı¨ve, hierarchical conception of the physiological over the
psychological. He does not even tip his hat to the truism that
organic brain processes accompany all subjective psychological
experiences. Nor does he cite research on the neurobiology of
emotion and its implications for psychiatric illness.
During emotional shocks or trauma, the body goes into a state of
emergency, and there is considerable evidence that repeated
shocks create lasting physiological changes. Although the mecha-
nisms are unclear and the results mixed, there is increasing
evidence that both cortisol levels and hippocampal volume are
affected, to give just two examples.11–13 And epigenetic studies are
beginning to uncover the effects of stress on gene expression. I will
cite a single example, a 2010 paper in Biological Psychiatry
‘‘Epigenetic transmission of the impact of early stress across
generations.’’14 The study exposed male mice to repeated and
unpredictable maternal separation, which had the effect of altering
the proﬁle of their DNA methylation—the modiﬁcation of a DNA
strand after it has been replicated. Comparable changes in
methylation were seen in their offspring even though they were
reared normally. To make it short, stress altered the pattern of gene
expression not only in the parent, but in the next generation. That
traumatic stressors appear to play a role in conversion disorder is
well known but poorly studied, and yet the burgeoning research
being done in affective neuroscience warrants, at the very least, a
careful reevaluation of what we mean by functional illness.
Lurking beneath our author’s use of the word fashionable, alas, is
an implicit sexual bias that dismisses incompletely understood
syndromes as all-in-your-head feminine complaints. The widely-
held belief that psychogenic or conversion phenomena are up to ten
times more common in women than in men, a statistic cited in the
DSM, only increases the odds that sexism plays a role in the
characterization of psychogenic illness. The truth is that conversion
seizures have been recorded in the largest numbers among combat
soldiers, most of whom, until recently, have been men. The trenches
of World War I were seething hotbeds of psychogenic illness.15 My
guess is that the horror of helplessness in soldiers who were literally
stuck in a hole as they watched their fellows being blown to bits, goes
a long way in explaining why ‘‘shell shock’’ became the illness of the
Great War. And it is not over. Many veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan
also suffer from conversion seizures.
The problem is getting the Veteran’s administration to
recognize their suffering as real. A letter posted on line in 2007
by a veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan may stand as exemplary.
The man had myriad symptoms—headaches, a recurrence of odd
smells, shortness of breath, fatigue, and seizures. After an EEG, he
was told that his seizures were non-epileptic, the result of
conversion disorder. I quote: ‘‘. . . the head of neurology, Dr. Sams,
came in and stated that everything was in my head and it was all
PTSD related’’. The patient was discharged and told to get physical
therapy. It is not odd that he was puzzled. ‘‘. . . if it is mental’’, he
writes, ‘‘then why am I going to physical therapy for it?’’.16
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chapter on PNES would admit to naı¨ve dualism, sexism, or bias
against emotionally produced illness, but I suggest they are all
present nevertheless. Historical context provided by medical
history may serve as a corrective to these underlying prejudices. In
the ﬁrst of the ﬁfteen lectures he gave at Harvard in 1907,
collectively titled The Major Symptoms of Hysteria, Pierre Janet
confronted the ambiguous character of what would now be called
psychogenic ailments. The symptoms of the disease are, he says,
‘‘exceedingly numerous’’ and ‘‘its limits. . .very vague.’’17 He
acknowledges that contemporary authors do not agree about
what falls under the term hysteria, but then goes on to articulate a
far broader ambiguity that every doctor and every patient should
bear in mind, ‘‘This indecision generally surprises young people.
You think that, in science, things are perfectly deﬁnite, and you are
very much astonished to ﬁnd indecision in your masters. In reality
deﬁniteness does not exist in natural phenomenon; it exists but in our
systematic descriptions. It is the men of science who cut separate
pieces out of a whole that nature has made continuous. . . Physicians,
it is true, may agree in certain cases, when there is a distinctly
visible objective phenomenon characterizing such and such a
lesion. . .but unfortunately we have nothing of the kind at our
disposal to deﬁne diseases of the mind’’ (my italics).17
Janet was a neurologist and a philosopher. His Kantian
inheritance is clear in his statement that it is we who cut the
world into pieces. We cannot leap out of our minds, become
omniscient, and see the world as it is. Objectivity in science is not
an absolute, but one determined by consensus, as Janet points out,
an agreement about a lesion, for example. And yet, those same
‘‘objective’’ categories change over time. In 1907, hysteria had not
yet been handed over to psychiatry. Charcot, with whom the
younger Janet worked at the Salpe´trie`re hospital in Paris, regarded
hysteria as a natural phenomenon, period, with an unknown
physical cause. Hysterics were not insane. For Janet, hysteria had a
psychobiological character caused by a mental dissociation of
particular functions from others, through what he called ‘‘a
retraction of the ﬁeld of personal consciousness.’’17 What is
missing, he argues, is ‘‘the faculty that enables the subject to say, ‘It
is I who feel, it is I who hear.’’17 Speciﬁcally addressing hysterical
tremor, Janet writes, ‘‘In some rare cases, you can ﬁnd behind the
tremors, as behind the tics, the existence of a ﬁxed idea separated
from the consciousness.’’17 Janet’s ide´e ﬁxe was an idea that had
been unconsciously transformed into a somatic symptom.
Whatever its cause, a conversion seizure is involuntary and real.
With scans, it is now possible to see visible asymmetries in the
brains of conversion patients that resolve themselves when the
afﬂiction ends. This, of course, does not explain what conversion is
even in neurobiological terms; it simply points to organic changes.
In The Shaking Woman, I quote a paper in Neurology by Trevor
Hurwitz and James Pritchard in 2006 published a century after
Janet’s lectures at Harvard: ‘‘conversion reactions are ﬁxed beliefs
of somatic dysfunction arising from psychological distress that
control cortical and subcortical pathways to produce patterns of
loss or gain of function that are not organic in the conventional
sense.’’18 This is no more precise than Janet’s description in 1907,
and a good deal less thoughtful. They also lift the term ‘‘ﬁxed
belief’’ from a much earlier era of psychiatry, probably from Janet. I
also quote a 1998 paper in Psychiatry Research, in which the
authors are more straightforward: ‘‘. . .the question of how special
psychological processes transmute into neurobiology has yet to be
answered.’’19 I point out that this is exactly what Freud asked and
hoped to answer in 1895 when he was working on his Project.20
How do we ethically frame the murky territory of non-epileptic
seizures?
The veteran, who after an EEG, is summarily told his
symptoms are ‘‘all in his head’’ and sent off to physical therapywithout further ado, has clearly been treated unethically. The
problem is not the diagnosis of conversion necessarily, although
I wonder about the man’s olfactory hallucinations and whether
his physicians may have missed something. The problem is that
his subjective experience of suffering has been dishonored by
cavalier treatment and, frankly, ignorance about the organic
character of what is now called PTSD. The most terrible thing
that can happen to a patient is to be robbed of the dignity of his
own narrative.
Every illness has a story because every illness is a dynamic, not a
static phenomenon that exists in time. Therefore static, mechanis-
tic models, whether in neurology or psychiatry, inevitably distort
the character of any illness. Patients must be allowed to tell their
stories, and they must be listened to as experts on the nuances of
their own symptoms. Their case histories are valuable as
documents of an unfolding story, and no two narratives will be
identical, but there is also a therapeutic value in telling itself,
which is related to the all important question of agency. Every
illness chips away at this aspect of the self. The disease or symptom
creates feelings of helplessness, vulnerability, and a general sense
that one lacks control over one’s own life. But even when a disease
or symptom persists without resolution, a sense of personal agency
can be strengthened.
In Injured Brains of Medical Minds: A View from Within, edited by
Narinder Kapur, a compilation of physician’s self reports on their
neurological disorders, a general practitioner, John Lisyak, who
developed epilepsy late in his life, meditates on questions of illness
and agency. ‘‘Understanding’’, he writes, ‘‘does not necessarily
change the reactions but it makes a difference to their severity.’’21
After stopping his medicine because he had been free of seizures
for three years, he had another tonic–clonic convulsion that was
followed by a depression. ‘‘However’’, he writes, ‘‘because of the
knowledge I had gained this depression was not accompanied by
the feelings of hopelessness. And even the ‘funny’ smell that
returned together with the emotional dread wasn’t nearly as
disturbing because I understood what was happening’’.21 His
symptoms are identical. He uses the words depression and dread to
describe them, but he acknowledges that his feelings have
nevertheless been transformed by an increased understanding
of the nature of his disease.
Knowledge creates a change in him, a change that I would
argue is psychobiological and related to a greater sense of agency
that arrives with understanding and narrative mastery. When I
learned to accept my migraines as permanent ﬁxtures in my life
and to practice biofeedback in the face of them, my life changed
and my pain lessened. The change is not just ‘‘mental’’. It is
physical or psychobiological. There are increasing numbers of
neuroimaging studies on depression, for example, which demon-
strate that the abnormal activity of the prefrontal cortex seen in
depression becomes normal after remission, when a patient has
been treated with either ﬂuoxetine or placebo.22,23 Placebo is of
course a top-down effect that involves beliefs, beliefs that trigger
relief both through the release of endogenous opioids in the brain
and by non-opioid mechanisms.24,25 Exactly how belief, an idea,
transmutes into physiological processes wasn’t understood by
Janet and it is not understood now.26 In all events, there is
increasing evidence for similar prefrontal normalization after talk
therapy,27,28 which may involve precisely the understanding
Lisyak cites as having altered his relation to his epilepsy. And this
brings us back to the internal narrator and Descartes’ cogito ergo
sum—that powerful subjective, if illusory, feeling of an ‘‘I’’ that
exists beyond the body.
What human beings have that animals do not is a highly
developed reﬂective self-consciousness that makes it possible
for us to alienate ourselves in symbols. We can represent
ourselves to ourselves in language. We can say ‘‘I’’ and that ‘‘I’’
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to how it is lived. I cannot emphasize this enough. Looking back
on his life, John Lisyak remembers, ‘‘not being able to do what
other children could. The village fair’’, he writes, ‘‘that ﬁlled
everyone with wonder and excitement made me feel uneasy,
and I was never happy to go on the Ferris wheel’’.21 Nor was I. I
simply couldn’t understand why the rides that caused intense
nausea, dizziness, and disequilibrium in me seemed so pleasant
to other children. The neurological hypersensitivity—visual,
auditory, tactile, olfactory—that arrives with migraine and/or
epilepsy is not all bad. I, for one, am not willing to trade in my
childhood sensitivities and raging pains, my many auras
followed by headache, or even my peculiar epileptiform, maybe,
maybe not pseudo-seizures, for a more normal trajectory
because these events are not only part of my story, they have
been crucial to my life as a writer of both ﬁction and nonﬁction. I
have sometimes wondered if I would have become a writer if I
had not had my particular neurological disposition. But my
pathological hypersensitivity (let us call it by its right name) has
also served me well because I have been able to frame this
quality of my being to my advantage through a self-narrative
that recognizes strength in what is often regarded as weakness.
Moreover, my insatiable reading in many disciplines and my
subsequent thinking about the question ‘‘what are we?’’ have
brought me what can only be called compensatory joy. If you
can’t cure yourself, you can certainly learn as much as possible
about what ails you.
Philosophy matters because it informs diagnosis. I think it may
be time for ‘‘functional’’ and ‘‘organic’’ to go the way of humors and
be replaced by other more subtle understandings of biological
processes. In the face of so much that remains unknown about
brain function, intellectual humility matters and, as a physician,
intellectual humility may involve explaining to a patient that you
don’t know what is wrong with him or her. It may mean being
wishy-washy and ambivalent, rather than ﬁrm and conﬁdent. It
may mean recognizing implicit prejudices in yourself against
psychogenic and/or emotional, psychiatric illnesses as somehow
effeminate and less ‘‘real’’ than a brain lesion. As a young woman
with debilitating migraines, I was at times treated with conde-
scension and exasperation by neurologists and medical profes-
sionals. Although some empathy in one’s doctor is certainly
desirable, an ethical position requires respect, above all, the simple
recognition that the patient in front of you has an inner life as full
and complex as your own.
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